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tiveness of punishment and reward in sustaining cooperation in a social
dilemma. Punishments tend to be directed at non-cooperators and re-
wards are assigned by those who are relatively cooperative. In contrast
to the results typically found in laboratory experiments, however, we
find that punishments and rewards fail to increase cooperation.
JEL Classification: C72, C92, C93.
Keywords: Field experiment, public goods game, social preferences, pun-
ishment, reward
∗We are grateful to the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research, NWO, for
financial support as part of the Program on Evolution and Behavior. We would like to
thank Ben and Shirley Willems for use of their fishing facility, and Paul Luden˜a Delgado,
Joris Hoendervangers, Stef van Kessel, and Menusch Khadjavi for excellent research as-
sistance. We thank seminar participants at Iowa State and Nottingham Universities for
helpful comments.
†Tilburg University, Department of Economics and CentER, Tilburg, the Netherlands.
‡Free University Amsterdam, Department of Spatial Economics and IVM, Amsterdam,
The Netherlands, and Tilburg University, Department of Economics and CentER, Tilburg,
the Netherlands.
§Erasmus University Rotterdam, Department of Applied Economics, Rotterdam, the
Netherlands. Phone: 003110-89517, e-mail: stoop@ese.eur.nl, adres: Burgemeester Oud-
laan 50, PO Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands
1
1 Introduction
The search for factors that promote cooperation in social dilemmas is a
focus of research in the social sciences (see for example Ostrom (1990)).
Controlled laboratory experiments show that cooperation among members
of a group can be promoted with a system of decentralized peer punishment
(see for example Yamagishi (1986), Ostrom et al. (1992), Fehr and Ga¨chter
(2000), Fehr and Ga¨chter (2002))), provided that the cost to the sanctioner
is sufficiently low (Anderson and Putterman (2006), Nikiforakis and Nor-
mann (2008), Carpenter (2007)). Similarly, if it is not too costly to do
so, the ability to reward peers can also increase cooperation (Sefton et al.
(2007), Vyrastekova and van Soest (2008), and Rand et al. (2009)). The
individual-level patterns of punishment and reward in the laboratory have
the intuitive features that it is typically non-cooperators who are punished
and cooperators who receive rewards. Non-cooperators respond on average
to receiving punishment by increasing their level of cooperation.
The generality of the ability of punishment to promote cooperation in a
social dilemma has been called into question in a recent paper by Janssen
et al. (2010). They consider a laboratory environment, which includes spa-
tial and dynamic elements that exist in many of the social dilemmas found
in the field, in particular those involving extraction of a common pool re-
source. Their environment has a resource located throughout a grid, and
group members can observe each other and adjust their behavior in real
time in response to others’ pace of extraction. The authors find that pun-
ishment is ineffective in reducing extraction of the resource, and thus fails
to promote cooperation, unless it is accompanied by the ability of players to
communicate with each other. They conjecture that the relative complexity
of the environment (by experimental standards) makes punishments more
difficult to interpret for the recipient. They write “. . . in a modestly complex
dynamic and spatial environment where participants can punish back but
cannot discuss why they are punished, receiving a sanction does not carry a
clear message. Does the sanction relate to the amount harvested, the loca-
tion, the spatial pattern of harvesting, the speed in which the avatar moves
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over the screen, etc. . . ?”
In this paper, we consider the effectiveness of punishment and reward
in promoting cooperation using a controlled field experiment. One typical
form of field experimentation is to alter one or more features of a laboratory
paradigm to conform more closely to field conditions, but in a manner that
allows the researcher to make causal inferences. This typically comes at a
cost of some degree of control of the experiment. Usually, the differences
between laboratory and field experiments lie in the context in which subjects
make decisions, the stakes at play, or the characteristics of participants
(see Harrison and List (2004) for a detailed discussion). The extent to
which laboratory results concerning pro-social behavior carry over to non-
laboratory settings has been the subject of recent debate (see Levitt and
List (2007), Levitt and List (2008), and Falk and Heckman (2009)).
The setting of our experiment is a recreational fishing facility. The par-
ticipants are regular customers of the facility. The fishermen are assigned
to groups of four members, and play a game with incentives very similar to
the linear Voluntary Contributions game (see Ledyard (1995) or Chaudhuri
(2010)), though with arguably a framing closer to a common pool resource
environment. The interaction is structured so that catching fewer fish gives
rise to a positive externality on other group members by increasing the time
that these others are allowed to fish. The incentives ensure that a social
dilemma exists. There are three treatments. In the Punishment treatment,
individuals have an opportunity to punish others after observing how many
fish they catch. In the Reward treatment, they can reward others. Pun-
ishment (reward) takes the form of decreases (increases) in the recipient’s
fishing time. In the Baseline treatment, they can neither punish nor re-
ward. The experiment has many of the features of the Janssen et al. (2010)
paradigm. In particular, individuals choose a cooperation intensity in real
time, they can update it in response to the real-time behavior of others,
and the setting is framed as an extraction of a resource. The design of the
experiment is described in section two.
In contrast to results reported from most laboratory experiments, but in
agreement with Janssen et al. (2010), we find no evidence that punishment
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promotes cooperation. Rewards are also ineffective. Fishermen fish with the
same intensity in the Baseline, Punishment and Reward treatments. Indeed,
there is no evidence of cooperation in any of the treatments. Nevertheless,
punishments, when imposed, are targeted at non-cooperators. Rewards are
used more often than punishments. Reward assignments are uncorrelated
with the cooperation level of the recipient, but are generally awarded by
those who cooperate in the social dilemma. Thus, punishment assignments
are dependent on the cooperation decisions of the recipient, while reward
decisions actions depend on those of the allocator.
Our results support three more general contentions that previous authors
have advanced. The first is that peer-to-peer punishment is not necessarily
effective in promoting cooperation, suggesting that the findings of Janssen
et al. (2010) are not an anomaly. The similarities between our field setting
and their laboratory environment suggest that it is features of the game
itself, rather than the fact that our study is a field experiment, which ac-
count for the ineffectiveness of punishment. The second is that our results
are consistent with the view that punishment is not necessarily applied in-
strumentally to increase cooperation. Because it is ineffective in increasing
cooperation, and is assigned by individuals who are not themselves coop-
erating more in response to receiving punishment, it is likely that some
punishment is assigned with no expectation of modifying the subsequent
behavior of the recipient. This pattern is consistent with the notion that
individuals have a taste for punishing non-cooperators (Fehr and Ga¨chter
(2000), de Quervain et al. (2004), Singer et al. (2006)). The third point is
that rewards can also be ineffective in promoting cooperation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the
setting, the experimental design and the procedures are described. Section
3 presents the data analysis, and section 4 concludes.
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2 The setting, experimental design and experi-
mental procedure
2.1 The setting of the field experiment
The experiment was conducted at a privately owned recreational fishing
facility called ‘De Biestse Oevers’.1 The site consists of three outdoor rect-
angular ponds, each of which is roughly 3500 square feet in area. Each pond
has room for twenty fishermen, ten on the the east and ten on the west
side. A half-day of fishing costs either e12.50 or e15. For e12.50, four rain-
bow trout are put into the pond while for e15, two rainbow trout and one
salmon trout, a larger trout species, are put in. Depending on the season,
a customer can either fish for four or five hours. A fisherman is allowed to
catch as many fish as possible within this time frame, but no compensation
is provided if a fisherman does not catch the fish that are released on his
behalf. There are strict rules in effect governing how individuals may fish.
For example, it is prohibited to use more than one rod at the same time, no
scoop net can be used to catch fish, and each fish caught has to be taken
away from the site when the fisherman leaves.
The setting has a number of features conducive to its use for experimen-
tation. First, the setting allows the experimenter to retain a strong degree
of control, since the pond used is self-contained, dedicated exclusively to the
experiment while a session is in progress, communication between partici-
pants can be monitored and restricted, and precise measures of cooperation
can be gathered. Second, the participant pool of recreational fishermen is
experienced with imposing negative externalities on one another. Because
the number of fish in the pond is fixed at the start of a regular fishing day
(when no experiment is being conducted), each fish a fisherman catches re-
duces the quantity of fish available to others. Third, individuals sampled
from the same subject pool are known to have behaved similarly to individ-
uals drawn from a pool of undergraduate students, in an abstract laboratory
social dilemma conducted for another study (Stoop et al. (2010)). That is,
1For photos, we refer to www.biestse-oevers.nl.
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in the laboratory experiment, the fishermen exhibit positive but less than
full cooperation, which then declines over time (see Ledyard (1995). This
indicates that any differences between our experiment and results from the
laboratory are unlikely to be due purely to subject pool differences. Fourth,
the context in which the current field experiment is implemented is natural
and familiar to the participants. The salient rewards in the field experiment
are fish and fishing time, the items that typically have value at the pond.
This makes it easier for participants to understand the rules of the game.
As indicated earlier, there were three treatments, called Baseline, Pun-
ishment, and Reward. The next subsection describes the Baseline treatment,
while the other two conditions are presented in section 2.3.
2.2 The Design of the Baseline treatment
In the Baseline treatment, participants are placed in groups of four. Group
membership is fixed for the entire session, but no participant is informed
about the identity of the three other members of her group. A session of the
Baseline treatment consists of two parts. Part 1 consists of three periods
of thirty minutes each, during which each participant is allowed to catch at
most two fish per period. Part 2 lasts for at most 150 minutes, during which
each participant is allowed to catch as many fish as he can. However, the
actual duration of part 2 for each individual participant depends on how
many fish each of the three other members of his group catch in part 1.
At the beginning of part 1, two rainbow trout per participant are put
into the pond, plus an additional six trout. In each session, 16 fishermen
participate, and hence we always throw in 38 fish at the start of a session.
The spot at which a fisherman fishes, is assigned by a lottery. In each of
the three thirty-minute periods, each fisherman is allowed to catch up to
two fish. After he catches a second fish within a period, the fisherman has
to stop fishing and wait until the start of the next period. The fisherman
is allowed to keep all fish he catches, and he does not receive any monetary
payment in part 1.
At the end of each period within part 1, each fisherman is informed of
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the number of fish caught by each of the other members of his group in the
period. This information is presented on a sheet of paper in a new random
order in each period. This ensures that participants cannot link the catch
of one group member in the current period to the number of fish he caught
in prior periods. At the start of each subsequent period, the number of fish
caught in the previous period is replenished. This means that, at the start
of each period within a session, an equal number of trout is present in the
pond. Thus, at least in principle, it is equally easy to catch a fish in each
period within part 1. In part 2, participants are free to catch as many fish
as they would like. In addition to being allowed to keep the fish, individuals
receive a bonus of e2 for each fish that they catch.
The social dilemma is introduced by the imposition of the following
rule. Each fish that a fisherman catches in part 1 reduces the length of
time that each of the other three members of his group can fish in part 2,
by ten minutes. Assuming that a fisherman has monotonically increasing
preferences over fishing time and money, fishing in part 2 is more valuable
than in part 1. This is because (i) each fisherman is not constrained in
the number of fish that he is allowed to catch, and (ii) each fish caught
yields a monetary bonus of e2, while no such bonus was paid in part 1.
We keep the level of difficulty of catching fish roughly constant within part
2 by replenishing the stock of fish every 30 minutes, throwing in the same
number of fish as were caught in the preceding 30 minutes.
Thus, the social optimum is attained if all group members catch no fish
in part 1. However, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy for each
fisherman is to fish at full force in each period of part 1, since only other
group members are harmed if an individual catches a fish. If all participants
catch their maximum allowable quantity of two fish per period in each of
the three periods of part 1, each participant’s available fishing time in part
2 is reduced from 150 to 0 minutes.2
To verify that participants perceived the game as a social dilemma, we
2Because of the non-negativity constraint on time, a participant’s fishing time in part
2 is set to zero if the other three participants in his group catch more than fifteen fish in
part 1.
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surveyed regular customers of the fishing pond, asking them which of the
following options they valued more highly: (i) to wait for ninety minutes
and then have 150 minutes of unconstrained fishing while receiving e2 per
fish caught, or (ii) to fish for ninety minutes with the right to catch up to
six fish. Option (i) is the strategy profile that is meant to correspond to full
cooperation, and (ii) is the profile corresponding to selfish behavior. Of the
21 fishermen we surveyed, 19 indicated a preference for option (i) over option
(ii), and hence we are confident that indeed our parametrization induces a
social dilemma. The text and results of the questionnaire are reprinted in
Appendix B.
2.3 The Punishment and Reward treatments
All of the rules described in the previous subsection for the Baseline treat-
ment are also in effect in both the Punishment and Reward treatments.
However, in the latter two treatments, subjects are also given an opportu-
nity to directly reciprocate to the behavior of the other three members of
their group. At the end of each of the three periods within part 1, sub-
jects receive information about the catch of each other group member. In
the Punishment (Reward) treatment, subjects can then choose to give up
minutes of their own part 2 fishing time in order to reduce (increase) the
part 2 fishing time of a designated group member, by three times as many
minutes. Punishments or rewards can be imposed in blocks of five minutes
(each reducing or increasing the recipient’s part 2 fishing time by fifteen
minutes). Subjects cannot spend more than a total of three blocks of five
minutes on punishments or rewards in a single period. All punishment or
reward decisions are made without knowing others’ reward or punishment
decisions for the current period.
If a subject’s period 2 fishing time has been reduced to zero as a result
of the fishing behavior of other members of his group and/or his own use of
punishment or reward blocks in part 1, he can not assign any punishments or
rewards. A fisherman could never have a balance of less than zero minutes
of part 2 fishing time. In the Reward treatment, subjects could end up
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with more than 150 minutes fishing time in part 2. In the event that their
time extended beyond the closing time of the facility for the day, subjects
would receive coupons that could be used at the facility at any future date
to reduce the entrance fee that is normally charged. Each coupon was worth
e3, and participants would receive one for every thirty minutes of unused
part 2 fishing time remaining.
After each subject has made his punishment or reward decision for the
current period, he is informed about (i) the total number of five minute
blocks (of rewards or punishments, depending on the treatment) the other
three group members have assigned to him, (ii) the total amount of part
2 fishing time he currently has available, and (iii) the total number of five
minute blocks of either rewards or punishments that were assigned to each
of the other members of his group.
2.4 Measurement of cooperation
Measuring cooperation in our field setting is less straightforward than in
laboratory experiments. In principle, cooperation may be measured by the
amount of allowable catch not caught by a group, as reflected by the follow-
ing equation:
C =
∑
i
xBaselineit /n−
∑
i
x
{Pun,Rew}j
it , (1)
where
∑
i x
{Pun,Rew}j
it is the total catch in period t of group j in either the
Punishment or Reward treatment, and
∑
i x
Baseline
it /n is the average catch
in period t of all n groups in the Baseline treatment. A value of C equal to
0 would indicate the absence of a treatment effect, and a positive level of C
would indicate the presence of additional cooperation in the Punishment or
Reward treatments relative to the Baseline. We will refer to this measure
as the Catch measure of cooperation.
An advantage of this measure is that it is easy to observe. A disadvantage
is that subjects may not always be able to catch all fish they would like to,
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because of insufficient skill or because of exogenous factors such as weather
conditions. Therefore, measuring cooperation by the remaining quantity of
allowable catch may overstate the extent to which subjects act cooperatively.
Fortunately, the setting allows us to employ a second measure of cooperation
based on the amount of effort subjects put into catching fish. Rainbow trout
are predators that actively pursue prey. When bait is dragged through the
water it naturally attracts the fish and the more the bait is exposed to trout,
the higher is the probability of catching a fish. Therefore, a fisherman can
increase his expected catch by casting his bait more frequently. Indeed, in
appendix A we show that there is a positive correlation between effort and
catch; the more often a fisherman casts his rod, the more fish he catches.
To gather data on how frequently participants cast their fishing rods, two
experimenters monitored the sixteen fishermen that were present in any
session and counted the number of times they cast their rods in every 5
minute time interval.
As a normalized measure of cooperation, we report the number of times
a fisherman casts his bait per minute. A comparison of effort levels in the
Punishment and Reward treatments, relative to Baseline, indicates whether
the instruments increase cooperation. We use an analogous measure of co-
operation to that presented in equation (1), but replacing the quantity of
fish caught per period with the average number of casts per minute. We
term the resulting value the Effort measure of cooperation.
2.5 Experimental procedures
The experiments were conducted in April and May of 2010. Recruitment
was done two weeks in advance by handing out flyers at the fishing site. All
sessions had sixteen participants, and no fisherman participated more than
once. Upon arrival at the pond, the fishing spots for part 1 of the experiment
were randomly assigned. The participants received instructions in groups of
four at each of the four corners of the pond. Each participant in an instruc-
tion group was subsequently reassigned to a different group for the fishing
activity, and participants were informed about this on beforehand. The
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instructions were given in this manner to prevent communication between
members of the same group. The instructions were read out aloud by the
experimenters, and the participants received handouts with the summary of
the instructions, which they could keep for the remainder of the experiment.
After the instructions, each fisherman individually answered some control
questions. The experiment began only once all participants had correctly
answered the test questions.
At the end of each period of part 1, an experimenter informed the partic-
ipants about the number of fish each of the other three participants in their
group had caught in that period. Catch data were presented anonymously
and in a random order. This rendered participants unable to link individ-
ual catch data between periods, from which they might be able to infer the
identity of their fellow group members. Each participant was also informed
about his amount of part 2 fishing time remaining. In the Punishment and
Reward treatments, players were also informed of the punishment assigned
to them by each other member of their group, in a format which ensured
that the identity of the assigning players remained anonymous.
Table 1 presents the number of groups that participated in each treat-
ment, and also the number of participants. In the analysis that follows, each
group’s average activity over a session is taken as the independent unit of
observation.
Treatment Number of Groups Number of participants
Baseline 12 48
Punishment 8 32
Reward 8 32
Table 1 Summary information about the three treatments.
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3 Results
3.1 Cooperation
Punishment and reward opportunities have no impact on cooperation in our
data. This is the case independently of whether the Catch or the Effort
measure of cooperation is employed. Figure 1 shows the average number of
fish caught per group (panel a) as well as the group averages of fishing effort
(panel b).
(a) (b)
Figure 1 (a) Average number of fish caught per group in the Baseline, Pun-
ishment, and Reward treatments. (b) Average effort per group in the three
treatments presented per five minute interval.
Figure 1 shows that the absolute levels of catch and effort in the Baseline,
Punishment and Reward treatments are very similar over the three periods
of part 1. There is a decline in the number of fish caught, as well as in the
level of effort, over time. However, this decline in catch and effort is similar
in all treatments, which implies that neither punishment nor reward has any
effect on cooperation. This finding constitutes our first result:
Result 1 The availability of punishment or reward does not change the
level of cooperation. Average Catch and Effort are the same in Part 1
in all three treatments.
12
Support for result 1: We perform a series of Mann-Whitney tests.
As an independent observation, we use the average catch or effort level of a
group during part 1. The catch in the Punishment treatment does not differ
from the catch in the Baseline treatment (N1 = 12, N2 = 8, p = 0.473).
Likewise, there is no significant difference between catch in the Baseline and
the Reward treatments (N1 = 12, N2 = 8, p = 0.427). There is also no sig-
nificant difference in catch between the Punishment and Reward treatments
(N1 = 8, N2 = 8, p = 0.195). With regard to the effort levels, there is no
significant difference between the Punishment and the Baseline treatments
(N1 = 12, N2 = 8, p = 0.521), between the Reward and the Baseline treat-
ments (N1 = 12, N2 = 8, p = 0.851), or between the Punishment and the
Reward treatments (N1 = 8, N2 = 8, p = 0.798). 
The data presented in Figure 1 illustrate the lack of treatment effects.
We now consider whether cooperation occurs at all. We do this in two ways.
Evidence of partial cooperation can appear in patterns within or between
periods. Players may reduce their effort (possibly to zero) to catch a second
fish in a period after they have caught the first fish in that period. This would
reveal a restraint in effort in catching the second fish, since the fisherman is
exerting less effort than he is able to. Players may also exhibit less effort in
part 1 than in part 2. This would show cooperation since only in the former
does catching a fish induce a negative externality on other players. We first
consider within-period cooperation, and report our finding as result 2.
Result 2 There is no evidence of partial cooperation within a period in any
of the three treatments.
Support for result 2: We compare the effort to catch the first and
second fish within a period. A series of Wilcoxon matched pairs tests shows
that effort levels remain the same after the first fish is caught. Each ob-
servation for these tests is the effort level of one fisherman in one period,
in which he has caught at least one fish. The matched pair consists of the
effort level of the individual during the time when he was trying to catch
the first fish in a period, and the effort level while trying to catch the sec-
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ond fish. In the Baseline treatment, the effort levels for the first fish are
not significantly different from those to catch the second fish in period 1
(N1 = N2 = 24, p = 0.768), in period 2 (N1 = N2 = 15, p = 0.198), or in
period 3 (N1 = N2 = 9, p = 0.401). Likewise, in the punishment treatment,
the levels of effort to catch the second fish are equal to those to catch the first
fish in period 1 (N1 = N2 = 9, p = 0.594), period 2 (N1 = N2 = 8, p = 1.000)
and period 3 (N1 = N2 = 7, p = 0.310). The same holds for the Reward
treatment, where the effort levels to catch the second fish are similar to
those to catch the first fish in period 1 (N1 = N2 = 10, p = 0.575), period 2
(N1 = N2 = 4, p = 0.273) and period 3 (N1 = N2 = 6, p = 0.345). 
As the second test for the existence of partial cooperation, we compare
catch and effort between parts 1 and 2 of the experiment. In part 2, there are
no negative externalities and there is even an additional incentive to try to
catch more fish (the e2 bonus per fish caught). However, when comparing
effort in part 2 to that in period 3 of part 1, we actually find that effort is
greater in part 1.
Result 3 Average effort in the last period of part 1 is greater than that in
part 2 in all treatments.
Support for result 3: We use a Wilcoxon matched pairs test, taking
the average effort level of a group in period 3, the last period, of part 1,
and the average effort level of the same group in part 2, as an independent
pair. Effort levels in period 3 of part 1 are greater in the Baseline treatment
(N1 = N2 = 12, p = 0.002), the Punishment treatment (N1 = N2 = 8, p =
0.024), and the Reward treatment (N1 = N2 = 12, p = 0.018). 
3.2 Punishment and reward assignments
We now analyze patterns in punishment and reward assignments. Figure 2
shows the average number of five minute blocks distributed per group over
the three periods of part 1 in the Punishment and Reward treatments.
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Figure 2 Average number of five minute punishment (reward) blocks sent per
group in part 1 of the Punishment (Reward) treatments.
Two results are evident from the figure.
Result 4 Rewards are allocated more frequently than punishments.
Support for result 4: A Mann-Whitney test, taking the sum of five
minute blocks used per group over the three periods as an independent
observation (N1 = 8, N2 = 8, p = 0.065), rejects the hypothesis that the
number of reward and punishment blocks assigned is equal (at p < 0.10). 
Result 5 There is no trend in punishment or reward use over the three
periods of part 1.
Support for result 5: Consider a Wilcoxon matched pairs test where
each matched pair consists of a group’s total number of punishment or re-
ward blocks assigned in period 1 and in period 3. Each group is taken as
one independent observation. In the Punishment (Reward) treatment, there
is no significant difference in the number of five minute blocks assigned be-
tween period 1 and period 3, as the p-value of the relevant Wilcoxon matched
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pairs test (with N1 = N2 = 8) equals 0.593 (0.599). 
On average, rewards are assigned more frequently than punishments, as
is the case in laboratory experiments (see for example, Vyrastekova and
van Soest (2008) and Rand et al. (2009)). The temporal pattern in the
quantities of rewards assigned is also in line with laboratory results(e.g.,
Vyrastekova and van Soest (2008)), with reward assignments increasing over
time. However, the same is not the case for punishment. In laboratory
experiments, the number of punishments imposed tends to decrease over
time (Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000)), both when individuals are in groups of
fixed membership or when they are grouped with new players in each period
(in this case there can be no future benefit from punishing members of
one’s current group). However, here we find that punishments are used
infrequently, even in the first period. Therefore, the lack of cooperation
observed in our setting does not appear to be due to the relatively small
number of periods in our experiment.
In laboratory environments, the use of punishments and rewards appear
to be at least partly motivated by reciprocal considerations. Those who free-
ride in the experiment’s social dilemma stage are punished while those who
cooperate are rewarded. We consider whether a similar pattern is observed
in our study. The results for the use of punishment and reward options
are reported in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. These two tables relate the
quantity of punishment and reward sent by fishermen based on the number
of fish that the sender and receiver have caught. For example, the top-left
cell of Table 2 indicates that 3 five-minute punishment blocks, each block
imposing a cost of 15 minutes to the recipient, were assigned by subjects
who caught zero fish themselves to subjects who also caught zero fish. The
number in square brackets (151) indicates the maximum possible quantity of
punishment blocks that could have been assigned (if all subjects who caught
zero assigned a quantity of one to all others that also caught zero).3 The
3The maximum number of punishment or reward blocks that can be imposed in the
experiment is equal to 8 groups of 4 group members who can use 3 blocks in 3 periods,
which equals 288.
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patterns in the table are summarized as result 6.
Result 6 Non-cooperators are more likely to receive punishment than co-
operators, while cooperators are more likely to assign punishment.
Cooperators are more likely to assign rewards than non-cooperators.
The likelihood of receiving a reward is independent of cooperation
level.
Total quantity of punishment assigned
classified by the sender’s catch
0 1 2 Total
Recipient’s catch 0 3 0 3 6
of fish [151] [44] [16] [211]
1 20 1 0 21
[43] [8] [5] [56]
2 6 0 0 6
[16] [5] [0] [21]
Total 29 1 3
[210] [57] [21] [288]
Table 2 Punishment assignments, by catch of sanctioner and recipient. Num-
bers in brackets represent maximum possible number of assignments.
Total quantity of reward assigned
classified by the sender’s catch
0 1 2 Total
Recipient’s catch 0 52 16 0 68
of fish [169] [39] [15] [223]
1 15 4 0 19
[38] [6] [3] [47]
2 5 0 0 5
[15] [3] [0] [18]
72 20 0
Total [222] [48] [18] [288]
Table 3 Reward assignments, by catch of rewarder and recipient. Numbers in
brackets represent maximum possible value.
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Support for result 6: Table 2 indicates that those who catch the fewest
fish are the most prone to imposing punishments. Players who catch no fish
do so in 29 of 210, or 13.8%, of possible cases, while those who catch at
least one fish punish in 4 out of 78 possible instances (5.1%). Punishments
imposed by those who catch no fish tend to be directed at non-cooperators.
In 26 of 59 possible instances (44.1%), players who catch no fish punish
another group member who has caught at least one fish. Those who catch
two fish are not punished more often than those who catch one fish.
Similarly, Table 3 indicates that those fishermen who catch relatively few
fish are also more inclined to send rewards to others. Players who caught
0 fish assign rewards in 72 of 222, or in 32.4% of all instances, while Play-
ers who caught 1 fish do so in 20 of 48, or in 41.7% of the opportunities.
Those who caught 2 fish never reward others. The probability that a player
receives a reward is rather independent of how many fish he caught: 30.4%,
40.4%, and 27.8% for those who caught 0, 1, and 2 fish respectively. 
We now consider whether receiving a punishment or a reward has any
effect on subsequent cooperation. Table 4 contains the estimates of a regres-
sion in which the dependent variable is subject i’s change in catch xi,t+1−xi,t
(columns (i) and (iii)), or change in effort ei,t+1− ei,t (columns (ii) and (iv))
from period t to period t + 1. The independent variables are the sum of
punishment or rewards received by subject i, namely
∑N
j 6=i pji. In case of
catch, the variable xi,t − x−i,t is included. This variable takes into account
the effects of regression to the mean, independent of the punishment or re-
ward instrument. Note that all subjects are given information on each group
member’s catch, but not on each group member’s effort. Therefore, the re-
gression to the mean variable is not included for the case of effort. The table
serves as the basis for result 7.
Result 7 Recipients of reward or punishment do not cooperate more in the
subsequent period.
Support for result 7: Table 4 shows that neither the receipt of punish-
ment or reward causes subjects to catch fewer fish, or exert less effort in the
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Dependent variable:
xi,t+1 − xi,t ((i) and (iii)), ei,t+1 − ei,t ((ii) and (iv))
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Punishment Reward∑N
j 6=i pji 0.358
∗∗∗ 0.038 0.128∗∗ 0.024
(0.071) (0.021) (0.061) (0.044)
xi,t − x−i,t −0.67
∗∗∗
−0.355∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.077)
Constant −0.216∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.235∗∗ −0.051
(0.108) (0.013) (0.1) (0.051)
N 64 64 64 64
R2 0.3797 0.0396 0.2685 0.0114
Table 4 OLS model to estimate the determinants of a change in catch (columns
(i) and (iii), or a change in effort (columns (ii) and (iv))). Standard errors,
clustered at the group level, are reported between parentheses.∗∗∗: significant
at the 1%-level, ∗∗: significant at the 5%-level.
next period. Moreover, the signs of the punishment and reward coefficients
are opposite of what is expected; the more punishment or reward a subject
receives, the more fish he catches in the next period. The positive effects
of punishment and reward on cooperation that appears in many laboratory
experiments are not found here. 
4 Conclusion
In our experiment, we find no evidence that punishment and reward oppor-
tunities increase cooperation. All of the available measures indicate that
fishermen try as hard as they can to catch as many fish as they can in part
1 of the sessions, regardless of whether or not punishments or rewards are
available. Furthermore, receiving a punishment or a reward fails to increase
the subsequent level of cooperation.
The ineffectiveness of punishment in creating cooperation contrasts sharp-
ly with most previous laboratory studies, but is consistent with the recent
work of Janssen et al. (2010). Their study, while conducted in the labora-
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tory, has the most similar context to ours of any study. This suggests that
the difference between most laboratory studies and ours may lie in features
of the games played, rather than in the fact that ours was conducted outside
the laboratory. Our setting shares many features with Janssen et al. (2010),
including (a) that individuals engage in a real time activity, (b) that they
can update their cooperation tendency in real time in response to cues about
how much others are cooperating, and (c) that the experiment is framed as
harvesting of a resource. Any one, or a combination of these features, may
make punishment and reward less effective.
Another aspect of our setting, which is not present in Janssen et al.
(2010), is that greater effort only imperfectly translates into a catch. The
intuition that this might reduce the effect of punishment finds support in re-
cent work by Ambrus and Greiner (2009) and Grechenig et al. (2010). They
show that, in a laboratory experiment with imperfect monitoring, receiving
punishment induces players to contribute less. The fact that imperfect mon-
itoring is not a feature of Janssen et al. (2010) suggests that is not likely to
be the main reason that we fail to observe cooperation here.
Despite its ineffectiveness in promoting subsequent cooperation, punish-
ment is typically assigned to those who catch the most fish from those who
catch the least. The link to earlier cooperation is less clear in the reward
treatment, where rewards, though assigned mainly by cooperators, are given
independently of how many fish the recipient has caught.
We observe that punishment is applied in a setting when it has no ef-
fect on subsequent cooperation, and by individuals who do not respond
to receiving punishment themselves. The fact that ineffective punishments
are still being imposed at positive cost to the punisher, suggests that our
subjects have an inherent taste for punishing non-cooperators (de Quer-
vain et al. (2004), Singer et al. (2006)), and a desire to reciprocate to prior
unkind actions (Gintis (2000), Fehr and Fischbacher (2003), Gintis et al.
(2003), Boyd and Richerson (1992), Henrich and Boyd (2001), Sethi and
Somanathan (1996) Gintis (2000)).
The results underscore that characteristics of the setting and the partici-
pants can influence the effectiveness of decentralized punishment in increas-
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ing cooperation. Prior research, for example Ostrom (1990) and Casari and
Plott (2003), shows that decentralized punishment can promote cooperation
in field settings. However, it is also clear that there exist many unresolved
social dilemmas in the field. Our results suggest that for punishment or re-
ward opportunities to be effective, interplay with other factors is necessary.
In our setting, one problem might be that there is status associated with the
activity that imposes the negative externality. Our fishermen might value
skillful fishing, and even though fishing success reduces the payoff of oth-
ers, these others may feel that the players who successfully catch fish are
entitled to a higher payoff. In other words, some participants may not view
the norm of cooperation as the norm that punishment should enforce. The
norm that we intend to create, one of maximizing social surplus, may not
override the prevailing norm at the fishing site, which is to try to catch as
many fish as possible. Thus, some punished parties may interpret punish-
ment for catching fish as inappropriate and respond by trying even harder
to catch more fish. A similar problem may inhibit cooperation in other field
settings, especially those in which there are very strong monetary rewards
or social status from achieving the highest payoff among group members,
such as some cases of the extraction of a valuable resource, price competi-
tion in a market, a patent race, or competing for a high course grade or a
job promotion.
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A Statistical analysis of effort on catch
In this appendix, we show the correlation between catch and effort, as mea-
sured by the number of times a fisherman casts his rod per minute. We
find a positive correlation: More effort leads to more fish, and therefore we
interpret our measure of effort as a legitimate proxy for cooperativeness. An
ordered Probit model is used, taking a fisherman’s catch and effort in each
of the four periods as an independent observation.
As Table 5 shows, the coefficient of Effort is highly significant. The quad-
rant dummy variables correct for the spot at which a fisherman is fishing.
Two of the quadrant variables are significant, indicating that the probability
to catch fish at some spots is higher than at other spots.
Dependent variable:
Number of fish caught in a period
Effort 0.871∗∗∗
(0.158)
Quadrant Fixed Effects Yes
N 448
pseudo-R2 0.0411
Table 5 Relationship between individual effort and individual catch.
Standard errors, clustered at the subject level, are reported between parenthe-
ses. ∗∗∗: significant at the 1%-level.
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B Questionnaire results
In this section we will present the questionnaire and the results that we used
to determine whether a social dilemma exists.
B.1 The questionnaire
Dear Fisherman,
On behalf of Tilburg University we would like your cooperation to fill in
a questionnaire. We ask you to indicate which of the following two options
is your preferred option.
Option 1 Option 2
Fish 1.5 hours at maximally 6 fish Wait for 1.5 hours at your fishing spot
and then fish for 2.5 unlimitedly
Fish 1.5 hours at maximally 6 fish Wait for 1.5 hours at your fishing spot
and then fish for 2.5 unlimitedly, receiving e0.50 for each fish caught
Fish 1.5 hours at maximally 6 fish Wait for 1.5 hours at your fishing spot
and then fish for 2.5 unlimitedly, receiving e1 for each fish caught
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
Fish 1.5 hours at maximally 6 fish Wait for 1.5 hours at your fishing spot
and then fish for 2.5 unlimitedly, receiving e15 for each fish caught
B.2 Results of the questionnaire
In all of our treatments, the social optimum is induced only when fishermen
prefer to wait for 1.5 hours in order to fish unlimitedly for 2.5 hours and
receiving e2 per fish. The following table shows the results of the previous
questionnaire. In total, we have surveyed 21 fishermen.
Willingness to accept to choose option 2 e0 e0.50 e1 e1.50 >e2
Number of Fishermen 14 3 1 1 2
Table 6 Results of the survey
As can be seen, 19 out of 21 fishermen claim to be better off when they
wait for 1.5 hours and then fish unconstrained for 2.5 hours and be paid
e2 for each fish caught. We are therefore confident that our experimental
parametrization induces a social dilemma.
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